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Research highlights 
• We review the biofuels policy of the European Union. 
• We examine whether the EU could be regarded as a ‘normative power’. 
• EU policy is viewed through the prism of the four dimensions of sustainability. 
• EU policy is largely unsustainable socially, environmentally, temporally and 
economically.  
• Normative intentions present, but economic competitiveness more central. 
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Abstract 
The rapid emergence of the European Union (EU) as a leader in global 
environmental politics has led many scholars to argue in favour of the EU being a 
‘normative power’ in international relations.  This paper critically examines the EU’s 
biofuels policy and evaluates whether its attempts to lead by example and shape 
international practice in this field could support such arguments.  Europe’s biofuel 
policies are evaluated through a sustainable development lens, so as to determine the 
extent to which it has embraced a holistic approach to sustainability.  While not 
dismissing that the identity of the EU is indeed an explanatory factor and that 
normative intentions may well be regarded as a motivating force, this study argues 
that an interest-based perspective on international environmental regulation offers a 
supplementary view of how an actor’s preferences for an international regime are 
shaped.  By erecting barriers aimed at shielding its own inefficient domestic biofuels 
production the EU is in essence placing trade competitiveness and economic growth 
above environmental protection, thus permitting sustainability concerns to be 
addressed only in part.   
Keywords: biofuels, sustainability, trade, environment, economy, society. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has made significant efforts during recent decades to 
position itself as a leader in environmental policy and indeed plays a significant and 
powerful role in promoting the concept of sustainable development on the global 
scene (Vogler, 2003).  The EU has taken a leadership role in the international 
negotiations on a number of environmental issues, with its role in the development 
of an effective and comprehensive regime on climate change naturally standing out 
and having received almost universal praise in the literature, as well as in the media 
(Afionis, 2011).  Apart from its active and high profile role in the climate regime, 
Europe’s environmental legislation is among the most advanced and progressive 
worldwide in a wide range of other areas, from greenhouse gas emissions trading to 
recycling, waste management, biosafety and eco-labeling (Falkner, 2007; Kelemen, 
2010). 
 The EU has been attempting to ‘carry the sustainable development flag on the 
international scene’ since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro (Lightfoot and Burchell, 2004).  Indeed, in 
the run-up to this landmark event, the 1990 Dublin European Council noted that the 
capacity of the EU to ‘provide leadership’ in the field of international environmental 
policymaking is ‘enormous’ (European Council, 1990).  With the concept of 
sustainable development becoming increasingly an accepted part of scientific and 
political discourse, the EU decided to proclaim it an official goal to be integrated in 
all EU policies and decision-making (Baker, 2006).  Far from it being just another 
political aim of the EU, sustainable development was explicitly included – for the 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3 
 
first time ever – as a fundamental objective in its relations with the wider world, in 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, as well as in its 2001 Nice and 2007 Lisbon successors. 
Consequently, Europe is involved in a continuing process to keep sustainable 
development on the agendas of instrumental international organizations and 
processes, such as inter alia the G-8, G-20, World Bank, UN Security Council and 
General Assembly and World Health Organization.  Europe played a rather 
constructive role during the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD or Rio+10) (see Lightfoot and Burchell, 2004), with its 
officials being eager to ensure that the deliberations of the 2012 Rio+20 conference 
in Brazil further augment the image of the block as a green leader and role model for 
other state actors.  With the focus being mainly on the theme of ‘green economy’, 
Rio+20 represents an ideal platform for Europe to globally communicate its recently-
adopted ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ for ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (see 
European Commission 2010a). 
 At first sight, this emergence of the EU as a pivotal actor in global 
environmental policymaking lends support to the claim that universal values and 
norms are at the centre of European foreign policy.  The EU has thus been described 
as a civilian power, a soft power and more recently as a normative power in 
international relations.1  The latter term was first coined by Manners (2002) to 
describe the EU as a distinct actor that is guided by and seeks to advance in the 
wider world the values and ideas on which it is founded upon, including democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 
                                                            
1
 The meaning of these three terms is more or less similar. A civilian or soft power employs soft-
power tools, such as diplomacy and the building of interdependence, rather than military 
confrontation (hard power). A normative power is one that attempts to diffuse/export the values and 
ideas on which it is founded upon to its surroundings. 
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2006).  While the EU might occasionally incorporate the threat of sanctions, thereby 
using its trade and aid ‘muscle’ in pursuit of its multifarious objectives, the bottom 
line remains that the EU’s ambition is to be a ‘force for good’ in world politics, 
seeking to advance its interests almost exclusively by non-military and ‘soft’ means 
(Wood, 2009: 113). 
 Scholars have attempted to understand the EU’s actions and account for this 
allegedly normative role by focusing on the EU’s unique nature.  Unable to compare 
the EU with any other entity in the international system, Vogler (2003) concludes 
that it should be treated as sui generis.  It is precisely as a result of its distinct 
historical evolution, its hybrid supranational-intergovernmental polity and its 
constitutional configuration that the EU is viewed as predisposed to act as a 
normative power in world affairs (Johansson-Nogués, 2007).  Reinforcing and 
exporting the EU’s normative character onto the world stage is an imperative process 
in the eyes of its officials, as it further augments the centrality of the EU as an 
international power, but also allows it ‘to present and legitimate itself as being more 
than the sum of its parts’ (Manners, 2002). 
Sustainable development is one of the core norms that form part of the EU’s 
normative outlook (Manners, 2008), but one that it is increasingly more eager to 
expand vis-à-vis the outside world, through its enlargement, environmental, trade, 
foreign and development policies (Falkner, 2007).  The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the notion of the EU as a normative power in an important emerging area 
of environmental diplomacy, namely biofuels regulation.  Though a relatively recent 
policy area, biofuels have triggered one of the most highly contentious debates on 
the current international sustainability agenda, given their links to energy security, 
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transport, trade, food security and climate change concerns (see Steenberghen and 
Lòpez, 2008).  Experts, NGOs and corporate actors are sharply divided concerning 
the sustainability of biofuels, resulting in a flood of literature highlighting this 
commodity’s social, environmental and economic implications.  European officials 
are nevertheless convinced as to the prospects of this renewable energy source for 
transport and have invested heavily in its promotion.    
This paper examines the allegiance of the EU to the norm of sustainable 
development, as reflected through its efforts to promote and diffuse its position on 
biofuels sustainability.  It will be argued that while the EU has been aspiring to 
integrate environmental thinking into every aspect of social, political and economic 
activity, the case of biofuels is nevertheless largely inconsistent with the thesis of the 
EU pursuing a normative external affairs agenda.  It instead confirms the image of a 
large trading state seeking to protect its native biofuels industry, even if doing so 
entails promoting or subsidizing uneconomical and energy inefficient production.  It 
is therefore concluded – sharing here Falkner’s (2007: 520) viewpoint – that there is 
a need to always ‘retain a critical perspective on any claim that power serves global 
interests and universal values’. 
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections.  Section 2 traces 
the historical evolution of the EU’s attempts to promote biofuels in the common 
market.  In section 3 we examine the implications for sustainable development 
(focusing in particular on its constituent dimensions) of the EU’s biofuels policies.  
Section 4 argues that while Europe is a different international actor and does aspire 
to integrate sustainability concerns throughout all areas of foreign environmental 
policy, a more critical reading of the normative power argument is nevertheless 
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requisite.  Supplementing this with an interest-based perspective on international 
environmental regulation offers a better understanding of the EU’s emerging role as 
a global environmental leader, focusing in the case of this study on biofuels.  
2. Emergence of EU biofuels policy 
Climate change gained sudden political salience within EU quarters around the 
beginning of the 2000s, with the bulk of legislative activities to curb greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions dating back from that period (Kelly et al., 2010).  A number of 
factors have supported the EU’s desire to cultivate a leadership role in climate 
change governance.  Firstly, the failure to adopt the European Constitution in 2005 
signalled the need for new issues that could reinforce the legitimacy of the EU and 
reinvigorate the integration process.  Given that abstract projects like ‘better 
regulation’ or the ‘internal market’ had proven uninspiring to Europe’s citizens, 
climate change was brought into the fore as – in addition to appealing to strong 
public concerns – it could provide a catalyst towards Lisbon Strategy-related goals, 
such as ‘spurring technological innovation, increasing energy security and creating 
jobs’ (Jordan et al., 2010: 10). 
Secondly, energy security concerns could also be addressed through the 
development of stringent climate policies.  Interestingly, even this issue is viewed 
within the context of sustainable development.  According to the Commission’s 
2006 Green Paper on energy, three core principles underpin Europe’s energy 
strategy: security (availability of supply), competitiveness (referring to price 
affordability) and sustainability (an environmental dimension) (European 
Commission, 2006; Egenhofer et al., 2006).  European interest in the promotion of 
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biofuels production is a relatively recent phenomenon, reflecting inter alia this 
increased EU preoccupation with energy security (European Commission, 2001a).   
In 2001 the European Commission first identified biofuels as a key future 
energy source for transport, concerned mainly by the two key factors: first that the 
EU’s transport system was almost entirely dependent on oil2, originating mainly 
from Russia3 and the politically unstable regions of the Middle East and Central 
Asia; and second that the EU was not progressing well in terms of meeting its Kyoto 
Protocol GHG emissions reduction target.  Failure to implement the Kyoto treaty 
would not only constitute a major political embarrassment, given the centrality of 
climate change on the EU’s sustainability agenda, but would also risk negating EU 
advances in environmentally sound practices in other areas. 
In an effort to address these issues, the Commission in 2000 had set up the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), the goal of which had been to 
develop recommendations on the most promising and cost-effective options that 
could enable the EU to meet its -8 percent Kyoto Protocol objective. By 2001, the 
ECCP had highlighted a number of important potential instruments, including a 
directive on biofuels.4  In a direct response to the ECCP report, the Commission put 
forward plans aimed at promoting the use of renewable fuels in transport, with the 
promulgation of the Biofuels Directive in 2003 marking the first significant 
milestone in the development of a coherent EU policy in this field.  Policy 
instruments promoting biofuels included domestic subsidization schemes, tax 
                                                            
2
 About 98 percent of transport consumption, representing 67 percent of final oil demand (see 
Commission, 2001b). 
3
 Europe’s concerns about energy security are centre stage following the 2006 and 2009 Russian 
energy-supply crises, which led to a partial or total suspension of Russian gas supplies to several EU 
member states.  Central and Eastern European states were the hardest hit by the embargoes. 
4
 See the Commission’s ECCP webpage for more information: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ 
eccp/index_en.htm 
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exemptions, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP5) provisions that directly 
encouraged biofuel feedstock production, plus funding for Research and 
Development (R&D) projects through the EU’s Framework Programmes for 
Research and Technological Development.  Notably, apart from climate change and 
energy security concerns, a key driver in most Member States for supporting biofuels 
relates precisely to prospects for rural development and employment (Di Lucia & 
Nilsson, 2007). 
Under the 2003 Directive, Member States were required to meet a set of non-
binding indicative targets of 2 percent by 2005 and 5.75 percent by 2010 for the 
inclusion of biofuels in petrol and diesel for transport (European Commission, 2003).  
The implementation of the Directive was nevertheless problematic at best, with 
biofuel consumption levels in 2005 reaching a mere 1 percent, of which Germany 
accounted for a staggering two-thirds (European Commission, 2007; Swinbank, 
2009).  With the exceptions of Germany, Sweden and Austria, the other Member 
States failed entirely to meet their 2005 reference values, with justifications for weak 
compliance on the part of their governments ranging from lack of agricultural land to 
national budget constraints and concern over the negative impact of biofuels on the 
environment (Di Lucia & Nilsson, 2007; ENDS Europe, 2005).  In the view of 
Commission officials, the Directive needed urgent revision (European Commission, 
2005), with binding targets being thought of as a much more suitable policy 
alternative (European Commission, 2007). 
In the run-up to the 2007 climate change convention in Bali, Indonesia, the 
EU – in an effort to reinforce its climate leadership credentials – announced the 
                                                            
5
 Note that energy crop payment and the set-aside scheme were both abolished in 2010 (see 
Swinbank, 2009). 
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adoption of its ‘energy and climate’ package.  Apart from focusing on emissions 
cuts, renewables and energy efficiency6, the package also included a proposal on a 
mandatory 10 percent biofuels target to be reached by 2020.  Following prolonged 
internal negotiations on the final shape of the actual legislation, the EU formally 
adopted the Renewable Energy Directive in April 2009.  This Directive represents 
the EU’s most ambitious to date attempt to boost the use of renewables among its 
Member States. 
Unlike its predecessor, the 2009 Directive draws an explicit link between 
consumption of biofuels and their sustainable production.  Public concern for 
potential negative impacts, coupled with widespread NGO criticism, has compelled 
the development of EU-wide standards and certification criteria to ensure a 
sustainable biofuels industry (see Genovesi, 2011).  Besides GHG savings (currently 
35 percent, rising to 50 percent in 2017), the EU’s sustainability criteria stipulate that 
biofuel feedstock is not to be derived from primary forests, lands with high 
biodiversity value, protected territories and carbon-rich areas (European 
Commission, 2009b).  Importantly, only domestically-produced or imported biofuels 
that meet the above criteria can be counted towards the EU’s 10 percent target.  In 
mid-2010, the Commission released detailed guidelines establishing inter alia the 
rules for the calculation method of land carbon stocks or for the recognition by the 
EU of voluntary certification schemes (see European Commission, 2010b; 2010c).7  
                                                            
6
 The known as Europe’s 20-20-20 targets included a 20 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions, a 20 
percent increase in use of renewable energy and a 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency; all to 
be reached by 2020 (see European Commission, 2009a). 
7
 The Commission is in the process of putting forward proposals by the end of 2012 aimed at 
extending the criteria for biofuels to solid biomass (see ENDS Europe, 2012b). 
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Biofuels certification is a response to concerns related to this commodity’s 
sustainability and as a result, a number of relevant schemes and initiatives have 
emerged in the recent past (e.g. the RSB8, the RTFO9 or the RSPO10).  A number of 
those have also developed standards for EU market access, intended to ensure 
compliance with the EU sustainability criteria (Scarlat & Dallemand, 2011).  In 
addition, standardization organizations such as the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
have also recently announced their intention to follow suit and develop sustainability 
certification schemes of their own.  In July 2011, the European Commission named 
the first seven biofuel certification schemes to win its approval (see ENDS Europe, 
2011).  Ensus, a UK biofuel sustainability certification scheme, is also expected to 
follow soon and secure approval by European authorities (Biofuels Digest, 2012). 
Such technical (or non-tariff) barriers to trade have generally received a 
mixed response from the South.  Brazil, on the one hand, is not adversely affected, 
given that ethanol from sugarcane is by far the most sustainably-produced biofuel 
worldwide, leading to GHG savings of up to 90 percent (Bomb et al., 2007; 
Goldemberg & Guardabassi, 2009; Souza, 2011).  Yet, it has expressed 
dissatisfaction with various parameters of EU biofuels legislation, such as land type 
definitions (Lydgate, 2012).11  On the other hand, Indonesia and Malaysia, fully 
aware of the link between tropical deforestation and palm oil production, are two 
actors hugely unenthusiastic about having to incur the cost necessary to meet 
                                                            
8
 Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels 
9
 Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation 
10
 Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
11
 While the Directive defines primary forests and natural protected areas, the Commission has yet to 
clarify what it considers as constituting highly biodiverse grasslands.  Brazilian expansion of ethanol 
production is being planned to occur in ecosystems of biodiverse grasslands.  
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additional requirements.  Both countries were actually contemplating filing a case to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the EU for introducing sustainability 
criteria in the 2009 Directive, viewing them merely as protectionism in disguise to 
favour domestically-grown biofuel feedstocks (Junginger et al., 2011).   
Nevertheless, some form of environmental assurance is imperative, as long as 
this proliferation of different and partially incompatible certification schemes does 
not negatively affect both sustainable development and trade.  Stressing this point, a 
cautious approach should be taken to certification so as to ensure that it does not 
create an unclear situation for producers or raises unnecessary barriers to 
international biofuel trade (see Zah & Ruddy, 2009; Kaditi, 2009).  Despite the drive 
for safety valves to ensure biofuels’ sustainability, the environmental, social and 
economic concerns associated with biofuels production have not ceased, but instead 
intensified.  The following section discusses the extent to which the EU has achieved 
the integration of all the dimensions of sustainable development while formulating 
its biofuels strategy. 
3. Dimensions of Sustainable Development 
The use of biofuels in the European market is becoming an increasingly 
controversial policy area, with the scale of the planned expansion – the 10 percent 
target to be reached by 2020 – giving rise to serious concerns as to whether it can be 
met in a sustainable fashion.  The EU’s response, namely the aforementioned 
criteria, has also become embroiled in intense debate, despite the criteria being the 
strictest worldwide to date. 
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Ensuring sustainability involves balancing seemingly conflicting needs 
across what is known as ‘The Three Dimensions of Sustainability’ (Gomar and 
Stringer, 2011).  There is a need for development that takes into account the social 
needs of the population, the imperativeness of protecting the environment and 
conserving natural recourses, whilst also ensuring stable levels of economic growth 
and employment (Sobrino & Monroy, 2009).  All three aspects are equally important 
in terms of sustainability and a balancing approach is therefore a sine qua non.  
Prioritizing is not an option, as doing so, Blackburn (2007) argues, is like asking, 
‘which is more important to human life: air, water, or food’?     
Along these lines therefore, overcoming poverty by relying on the existing 
business-as-usual growth ideology is self-defeating, as mounting environmental 
costs will at some point negate any production benefits (Daly, 1996).  Obsessively 
protecting the environment, thereby hampering economic growth in the process is 
also not an option (Sobrino & Monroy, 2009).  Therefore, sustainability is, in 
essence, measured by the degree to which economic development takes into account 
ecological and social thresholds, that if surpassed, risk unravelling all three 
dimensions (Gomar and Stringer, 2011).   
Interestingly, the EU in its 2001 Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) 
has also formally recognized that striking a balance between environmental, social 
and economic objectives within the common market is a fundamental prerequisite of 
sustainable development.  Yet, while the SDS acknowledges the necessity for 
‘difficult trade-offs’ between the three dimensions, the EU has nevertheless been 
criticised for not putting into place precise guidance on how to actually make such 
‘balanced’ decisions, as well as for neglecting the external repercussions (e.g. on 
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developing countries) of its internal policies (Adelle & Jordan, 2009: 114).  In a 
similar tone, Pallemaerts (2006: 38) notes that the European Council has treated the 
annual review process of the SDS as a ‘cursory, pro forma exercise’, thus failing to 
seriously reflect on its purpose, scope and overall status with regards to EU 
sustainable development policymaking.   
An increasing number of authors argue that the three dimension perspective 
on sustainability lacks continuity, as the focus is mainly on current activities, thus 
failing to take into account interactions among the ‘short-, long-, and longer-term’ 
(Lozano, 2008).  Policy decisions nowadays generally have short time horizons, in 
the order of years rather than decades. Given though the complexity of ecosystems, 
coupled with scientific uncertainties on how these may be impacted in future times, 
policy decisions that lack a focus on time may result in irreversible consequences 
and thresholds being breached (see Adam, 1998; Kümmerer, 1996).   
Since the term sustainable development means so many different things to so 
many different people and organizations, this study considers the time dimension 
through the way it is integrated in policymaking with a view to placing society on to 
a balanced, sustainable growth path.  The next section applies the debate on 
sustainability dimensions to biofuels and offers an account of how exactly this 
commodity fares in terms of achieving the aforementioned delicate balance. 
3.1 The 2009 Directive and the social dimension 
Starting with the social dimension, the Directive does not in any way consider what 
the rapid expansion of biofuels markets might entail for the social needs and well-
being of individuals in terms of food security, appropriate wages and working 
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conditions or land rights of smallholders and indigenous peoples (see Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2011).  European officials debated the adoption of such social 
criteria for quite some time, but eventually decided against doing so, given that such 
measures were considered to be incompatible with WTO provisions (European 
Commission, 2008; Lydgate, 2012; Swinbank, 2009).12  The only socially-related 
commitment to be found in the Directive is an obligation on the part of the 
Commission to produce a biennial report on the impact of EU biofuels policies on 
social sustainability, ‘the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices’ and ‘land use 
rights’ (Article 17).  Notably enough though, five out of the seven recently 
recognized biofuel certification schemes do include requirements on social issues, 
thus allowing the EU to partially address – albeit indirectly – various social concerns 
associated with biofuels production.13  In addition, EU officials are working on 
developing a list of voluntary criteria, aimed at addressing inter alia social 
sustainability concerns (European Commission, 2011).  
 Yet, the severity of biofuels-related social impacts that have been identified 
in developing countries over the years seems to necessitate far more stringent action 
(see Hall et al., 2009; Schaffel and La Rovere, 2010).  To offer a few examples, 
widespread biofuel production could result in, or exacerbate, poor labour practices.  
Amnesty International has repeatedly reported that poor working conditions, health 
and safety risks, as well as child and forced labour are common practice in a number 
of biofuel-producing developing countries (see Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
                                                            
12
 It should be noted that the EU – the region with the strictest and most expensive labour laws 
worldwide – had argued during the 1990s in favour of integrating social standards into WTO affairs.  
Nevertheless, it had to eventually back down due to the unwillingness of developing countries to 
permit the Union to enhance its competitiveness by exporting its laws to countries with lower 
standards (Van den Hoven, 2006).   
13
 Only the Abengoa RED Bioenergy Sustainability Assurance (RBSA) and the Biomass Biofuels 
voluntary Schemes (2BSvs) do not include requirements on social issues. 
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2011).  Land rights are another pressing concern, as so-called ‘land grabs’ by e.g. 
palm oil producers in Indonesia or Malaysia have been widely reported (see Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2011).  The unregulated expansion of agricultural land for 
production of biofuel feedstock could provoke conflicts over land rights, leading to 
the clearing of forestland or farmland and the displacement of indigenous tribes 
(Dufey, 2007).  Actually, North European companies are eagerly buying massive 
tracts of land in Africa for the cultivation of biofuels, often paying little attention as 
to whether or not local people lose access to and control over lands and ecosystems 
on which their livelihoods depend (EUobserver, 2009; Matondi et al., 2011). 
  The greatest social concern regards the impact of increased biofuel 
production on food prices and production.  The economic effects of large-scale 
biofuels production could involve serious ethical and social repercussions, as 
dedicating a sizable part of the harvest production to biofuels could potentially drive 
food prices up, therefore leading to starvation and urban riots.  The literature is 
currently divided as to whether or not biofuels are to be held responsible for the 
alarming increases in food prices experienced between 2007 and mid-2008, which 
resulted in riots being sparked in Mexico, Haiti, Yemen, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.  
One group of authors (e.g. Pimentel et al., 2010; Searchinger et al., 2008; Banse et 
al., 2010; Gordon, 2008) argues that prices of agricultural products tend to increase 
as a direct outcome of enhanced biofuels consumption, whereas another group (e.g. 
Harvey & Pilgrim, 2011; Hira, 2011; Ajanovic, 2011; Cockerill & Martin, 2008) is 
of the view that other factors, such as inter alia the rise in the price of oil and 
fertilizers has had a more significant effect on food prices than any attributable to 
biofuels.  Former EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs (2009) joined the chorus by 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
16 
 
dismissing many statements made on the relation between biofuels and food prices 
as ‘out of proportion’, arguing that the impact of European biofuels production on 
current global food prices was minimal.  In any case, this ‘food versus fuel’ debate is 
still ongoing and will probably remain so for quite some time to come. 
 A potential solution to this controversy would be to invest in the 
development of so-called 2nd generation biofuels that are produced from a variety of 
inedible sources, such as woody crops, energy grasses, or even agricultural and 
forestry residues (SUNLIBB, 2012).  In this respect, supporting the current 1st 
generation biofuels market is a first step in developing more sustainable and cost-
effective second-generation biofuels (Baka & Roland-Holst, 2009).  However, some 
scholars question whether stakeholders who have invested heavily in 1st generation 
biofuel production plants would be eager to shift to 2nd generation biofuels, thereby 
rendering unprofitable not just 1st generation feedstock cultivation, but also the entire 
production chain (Berndes et al., 2010).   
Current policies to stimulate 2nd generation biofuels production, such as the 
2009 Directive’s provision that such biofuels can be double counted in the renewable 
transport fuels target of 10 percent, do not seem to have induced the robust 
development of conversion technologies for these biofuels.  Business stakeholders 
participating in a 2011 biofuels event in Verona, Italy14, argued that apart from the 
double-counting rule lacking industrial monetary value, the fact that Member States 
do not really rely on 2nd generation biofuels to meet part of their targets immensely 
reduces the rule’s inventiveness.   
 
                                                            
14
 The Second International Conference on Lignocellulosic Ethanol (2ICLE), 11-13 October 2011. 
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3.2 The 2009 Directive and the environment dimension 
Despite the sustainability criteria, the 2009 EU Directive fails to take into 
consideration a number of issues related to the threat biofuels might pose to the 
environment.  For instance, large-scale biofuel production could trigger air, soil and 
water degradation, given the considerable amount of fertilizers and pesticides 
required by certain first-generation feedstocks (Charles et al., 2007).  According to 
EU officials, the EU opted against including binding criteria on these issues in the 
Directive, as it would again be unable to justify such trade-distorting measures to the 
WTO (Lydgate, 2012).  As a result, they were merely included in reporting and 
monitoring requirements under the Directive.  In contrast, the inserted climate and 
biodiversity criteria might stand, as those relate to environmental issues of global 
concern that are recognized in international multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) (Di Lucia, 2010).   
While developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the direct and 
indirect undesired effects of biofuel production, Europe will also be affected.  Of 
course, the fact that biofuel production in the Member States is subject to cross 
compliance rules specified under the EU’s CAP – in essence a fourth criterion in the 
Directive (Article 17.6) – could ensure that the strain on the European environment 
is substantially relieved.  Even so, Genovesi (2011) warns inter alia against the 
prospect of biological invasions, noting that due to high volumes of trade, Europe is 
a particularly prone area, with a plethora of unwanted weedy plants and alien pests 
having already established themselves in the continent during recent decades.   
Among the greatest environmental concerns with biofuels production is that 
their increased use could cause considerable land use change (LUC), both direct 
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(dLUC) as well as indirect (iLUC).15  The EU, while specifying mechanisms in the 
Directive for dealing with dLUC, has not as yet reached a final decision on how to 
address iLUC emissions in legislation.  A 2010 communication, while 
acknowledging the urgency for immediate action, noted that the uncertainties 
associated with the available computer models for estimating iLUC impacts 
necessitated more time for the Commission to identify the most suitable policy 
approach on the matter (European Commission, 2010e).   
Indeed, a scientific consensus as to how to monitor and control iLUC is 
currently lacking (Di Lucia, 2010; Chalmers et al., 2011; Fairley, 2011).  
Nevertheless, in the United States the revised Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS2) 
does include iLUC in its GHG emissions methodology, meaning that the EU needs 
to soon identify an effective approach to modelling iLUC, as well as come up with 
potential iLUC mitigation options.  The EU was planning to come forward with a 
legislative proposal on iLUC during March 2012, but such plans did not eventually 
materialize due to disagreements within the Commission as to whether an iLUC 
factor should be introduced as a penalty for biofuels that are environmentally 
unsustainable (ENDS Europe, 2012a). 
3.3 The 2009 Directive and the economy dimension 
The imposition of tariffs and the institution of subsidies are the two main 
mechanisms governments generally tend to employ in order to foster the 
development of their national biofuels industry.  As Hebebrand & Laney (2007) 
                                                            
15
 For a detailed description see Fehrenbach et al. (2008).  In simple terms, if a farmer decides to grow 
biofuel feedstock on previously uncultivated land, this will cause dLUC.  If the farmer uses existing 
agricultural land, this will mean that the crop that was previously cultivated there will now be 
displaced and will have to be moved elsewhere, e.g. to forest land, thus causing iLUC in the process. 
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note, policymakers can be very sensitive to the fact that domestic agricultural 
interests aspire to be the ones primarily profiting from ample incentives to increase 
biofuels production.   The current high level of protectionism on the part of the EU is 
therefore to be expected, given that its main objective is to limit imports of biofuels 
in order to boost their production domestically (Bomb et al., 2007; Hebebrand & 
Laney, 2007).  Nevertheless, this approach scores badly on a number of fronts in 
terms of economic sustainability. 
 First, supporting domestic production through high tariffs entails hindering 
the entrance of biofuels from more competitive producers.  Due to a combination of 
land availability, low cost/prices for agricultural crops, favourable climatic 
conditions and low-cost farm labour, a number of (mostly) tropical countries (e.g. 
Brazil) have a productive advantage when it comes to biofuels (Machado-Filho, 
2008; Johnson & Virgin, 2010).  Cost-wise, biodiesel and ethanol production in the 
EU is not profitable without substantial fiscal support.  Ethanol production costs, 
including subsidies, are two and three times higher than in the US and Brazil 
respectively (Motaal, 2008).  Paradoxically enough, even in biodiesel – where the 
EU is by far the world’s leading producer – costs are higher compared to the US, not 
to mention Brazil (Motaal, 2008).  Therefore, it is argued that biofuel imports from 
favourable climates could significantly promote the economic sustainability 
dimension of trade (Bomb et al., 2007).  
 Second, apart from biofuels in Europe being heavily subsidized and thus 
produced way above the opportunity cost of the fossil fuels they replace, they are 
also far less energy efficient compared to their counterparts in tropical countries 
(Trindale, 2009).  Around four-fifths of the demand for biofuel in the EU is met by 
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biodiesel, with over 80 percent of this production being derived from ‘home grown’ 
rapeseed, a feedstock considerably low in energy per hectare and in GHG savings 
(Harvey & Pilgrim, 2011).  Biofuel energy efficiency depends on the type of the 
feedstock used, the cultivation methods employed and the conditions under which 
the crop is produced (Hira, 2011).  When all these factors are taken into account, 
sugarcane ethanol from Brazil, for example, is recognized as both the most 
sustainable option currently available in the market, plus as the most price-
competitive biofuel in the world (Afionis, 2010; Tan et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2009; 
Farinelli et al., 2009).   
As a result, a number of analysts and scholars again argue in favour of the 
EU opening up its inefficient biodiesel-dominated market to ethanol producers from 
the South in order for the most energy efficient and sustainable biofuels to be 
promoted, regardless of their country origin (Hira, 2011; Trindale, 2009; Hebebrand 
& Laney, 2007; Bomb et al., 2007).  Doing so is deemed a sine qua non, since – 
given the limited potential of energy crops in the industrial North – Europe will have 
no alternative but to heavily rely on imports if it is to reach its ambitious fuel 
substitution goals (Zah & Ruddy, 2009; Kaditi, 2009). 
Third, apart from energy efficiency or international trade competitiveness, 
there exists also a developmental angle to this debate that needs to be highlighted.  
As an actor aspiring to normative leadership, the EU could not but be strongly 
committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).16  According to EU 
policymakers, helping the world’s most disadvantaged populations, eradicating 
                                                            
16
 The MDGs are eight targeted development aims designed to free humanity from extreme poverty, 
hunger, illiteracy and disease by 2015. They were adopted in September of 2000 during the 
Millennium Summit at United Nations headquarters in New York. 
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poverty and improving living conditions comprise top short-term priorities 
(European Commission, 2010d).  Indeed, the EU provides more than half of 
worldwide development aid.  In 2003, the then EU Environment Commissioner, 
Margot Wallstrom, noted that ‘our credibility will suffer if […] our policies have 
detrimental impacts outside the EU, in particular on the development opportunities 
of the poorest countries’ (in Adelle & Jordan, 2009).  Yet, in the case of biofuels, the 
evidence seems to suggest that the EU is failing to live up to its rhetoric. 
Strong protectionism on the part of the EU entails that those countries that 
are better suited to produce biofuels are actually prevented from fully benefiting 
from the surge in global demand for this commodity, thus undermining their 
potential for economic development and poverty reduction.  Moreover, the 
prevailing tariff escalation systems17 act as a stimulus to developing countries to 
prioritize exports of feedstock, such as unprocessed molasses or crude oils, thus 
allowing the importing industrialized countries to reap all the profits associated with 
final biofuel conversion (Dufey, 2007; Kaditi, 2009).18  Farmers too are 
disadvantaged, as not only are they deprived of potential markets for their produce, 
but the little income they do laboriously manage to secure from export production is 
often miniscule compared to that of actors in upper parts of biofuels supply chains 
(Gordon, 2008; Dufey, 2007). A ‘fairtrade’ type of scheme, as proposed by the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011), could represent a potential solution. 
 
                                                            
17
 Tariff escalation occurs when an importing country protects its processing or manufacturing 
industry by applying higher duties to imports of finished products compared to those of unprocessed 
commodities or raw materials. 
18
 As Kaditi (2009) notes, the EU, for instance, ‘applies a 3.8 percent tariff on imports of crude palm 
oil, 9.0 percent on imports of refined palm oil and 10.9 percent on imports of stearin from Indonesia 
and Malaysia’. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
22 
 
3.4 The 2009 Directive and the time dimension 
The 1987 Brundtland Report is generally considered the starting point for most 
current discussions on the concept of sustainable development (Lozano, 2008).  
Currently, there exists a plethora of competing definitions of this concept in the 
literature and debates have erupted between those scholars who prefer the three 
dimensions approach, or a more holistic perspective (emphasizing e.g. the 
relationship between the three dimensions and temporal aspects) (see Mebratu, 1998; 
Lozano, 2008 for overviews).  As outlined earlier, factoring in the time dimension 
requires defining the priorities between short-term and long-term goals, choosing 
realistic time horizons, and dealing with uncertainty.   
Biological phenomena are quite complex, their interactions span multiple 
temporal and spatial scales, that scientists have coined the term ‘biocomplexity’ to 
describe ‘nonlinear, chaotic, or even unpredictable behaviours’ (Michener et al., 
2001).  Ecosystems are so convoluted, and the time periods required for the 
manifestation of changes in the system itself or its behaviour so long, that we cannot 
really count on scientific certainty to accurately predict the future effects on the 
environment, the society or the economy of the myriad technological products and 
substances manufactured by modern humankind (Kümmerer, 1996).  For such cases 
of unknown risk, advocates of the time dimension propose the ‘precautionary 
principle’ (see Dovers, 1995).  As Kümmerer (1996) notes, if there are suspicions 
about negative effects, then ‘production should be decreased or halted altogether’.  
Strange & Bayley (2008: 132), argue that since no model or foresight can give us all 
the information we would want, policies and their goals need to be ‘rigorous enough 
to be effective, but flexible enough to adapt as circumstances and priorities evolve’. 
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If this debate on temporality was to be applied to biofuels, many uncertainties 
surrounding them would straightaway be noticed, several of which have already been 
noted in the preceding sections.  Starting with societal impacts, the exact impact of 
biofuels on food prices and production remains still a polarized debate.  Equally 
unknown is the precise manner in which this sharp expansion of worldwide interest 
in transport biofuels will affect the livelihoods of smallholder farmers and their 
communities in developing countries (see Matondi et al., 2011). 
Turning to environmental uncertainties, scientific ambivalence on how to 
precisely measure iLUC has already been highlighted.  A second example – and one 
that is especially illustrative of the complexities involved in greenhouse gas 
accounting – is the September 2011 opinion of the European Environment Agency 
(EEA), according to which the widely held assumption that biomass combustion is 
inherently ‘carbon neutral’ because it only ‘releases carbon taken from the 
atmosphere during plant growth’ is in fact incorrect (European Environment Agency, 
2011: 1).  Consequently, the EEA recommends that all EU policies and directives 
related to bioenergy should be comprehensively revised.  The EEA’s findings have 
been recently supported by Haberl et al. (forthcoming), who argue that burning 
biomass for energy purposes could actually increase the carbon in the air if, for 
example, the harvesting of the biomass leads to reductions in carbon sequestration. 
Given the profusion of risks associated with biofuels, proponents of a more 
holistic approach to sustainability would opt in favour of the EU slowing down its 
efforts to increase biofuels consumption in the common market.  Following an 
estimation of the overall global cropland that would be required to meet Germany’s 
domestic biofuel consumption needs, Bringezu et al. (2009) propose that given the 
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serious implications for global land use and food security, Germany should reduce – 
rather than increase – its biofuel quotas and targets.  A number of authors concur 
with such findings and maintain that given the dubiety of biofuels, governments 
should ‘take their foot off the accelerator’, so as to provide science ample time to 
fully evaluate the risks associated with biofuels (Florin & Bunting, 2009). 
Arguing therefore along such lines, the pitfalls associated with biofuels 
render them an inappropriate answer to the climate crisis.  In other words, over-hasty 
decision-making is not guided by advocating intra- or inter-generational interests, as 
it is simply unable to respond to the uncertainties and ignorance of long-term 
impacts of biofuels on the environment.  As the UK government’s climate change 
envoy J. Ashton pointedly noted: ‘The policy on biofuels is currently running ahead 
of science’ (in Florin & Bunting, 2009). 
4. Sustainability leadership vs. interests? 
Promoting a global sustainability agenda has been interpreted as evidence of the EU 
genuinely attempting to fulfil its role as a normative power in a successful and 
credible way (Baker, 2006; Groenleer & van Schaik, 2007).  In this sense, European 
environmental leadership ‘departs from the realpolitik tradition in foreign policy and 
promotes the global common good over and above the national interest’ (Falkner, 
2007). 
However, such an interpretation of the EU’s global green role is problematic, 
as it provides an incomplete picture of the forces driving European environmental 
policy.  Falkner (2007) argues that viewing European foreign environmental policy 
through a political economy lens could greatly contribute towards developing a more 
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rounded understanding of the factors shaping an actor’s position in controlling 
international ecological problems.  In other words, what Falkner (2007: 521) means 
is that identity and economic interests need to be studied together as they are ‘closely 
intertwined’.    
A similar approach is adopted by Kelemen (2010), who argues that economic 
interests provide the main motivation for the EU taking on a leadership role in 
international environmental policymaking, with normative aspirations only playing a 
secondary or complementary role.  According to his line of thinking, strong domestic 
electoral pressure since the 1990s has led several (mainly Northern) Member States 
and therefore the EU itself to adopt stringent environmental policies and standards 
on a plethora of issues.  Subsequently, given the implications for European firms, it 
is in the competitive trade interests of the EU to champion international agreements 
that would result in other jurisdictions adopting environmental regulations of a 
comparative nature – much like the US had done in the 1970s and 1980s (Kelemen 
& Vogel, 2010).    
Indeed, the normative power perspective with its focus on global interests 
and universal values would be largely unable to explain why an actor so keen on 
promoting the environmental sustainability of international biofuels trade, actually 
impedes imports of biofuels that are far more energy efficient compared to their 
heavily subsidized domestic counterparts.  This inconsistency between the EU’s 
support for universal norms and the reality of European protectionist actions seems 
to be explained best from an interest-based perspective. 
The interest-based approach is a national-level explanation, focusing on the 
domestic factors influencing a country’s position in the international environmental 
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arena.  In order therefore to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of EU 
biofuels policy, European interest in environmental sustainability must be examined 
in conjunction with other policy objectives, namely those of economic and trade 
competitiveness.  While Europe aspires to be a global environmental leader, sight 
should never be lost of the fact that it is above all the world’s largest trading bloc, 
accounting for one fifth of global trade (DG Trade, 2009). 
 The EU’s high tariffs placed on ethanol are a clear indication of its intent to 
limit imports, thereby shielding local EU production against cheap imports, mainly 
from Brazil.  Interestingly enough, the Commission (2007: 7) frankly admits so in its 
2007 Roadmap: ‘From a trade perspective, the EU maintains significant import 
protection on some types of biofuels, notably ethanol which has a tariff protection 
level of around 45% ad valorem’.  It then goes on to state that ‘if it would appear 
that supply of sustainable biofuels to the EU is constrained, the EU should be ready 
to examine whether further market access would be an option to help the 
development of the market’. 
 This aforementioned option has been upheld by high-echelon EU officials, 
with former EU trade commissioner Mandelson stating in 2007 that ‘we cannot 
contemplate favouring EU production of biofuels with a weak carbon performance if 
we can import cheaper, cleaner biofuels... .  Resource nationalism doesn’t serve us 
well’ (in Hira, 2011: 6934).  However, the lack of progress on relaxing tariffs is 
indicative of how trade concerns are prioritized in EU policymaking and how 
agricultural lobbyists have strategically positioned themselves in both the heart of 
the EU quarter in Brussels, as well as in Member States’ capitals.   
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The current stalemate in the WTO Doha Development Round offers valuable 
insights into the manner Europe’s normative power aspirations are superseded by 
more mainstream political concerns, in this case the need to protect domestic 
agricultural interests and safeguard the income of farmers.  The WTO is the EU’s 
arena of preference in which to deal with a wide range of issues relating to biofuels, 
such as liberalization of EU agricultural markets or biofuels classification.19  It has 
insisted that bilateral or regional fora are inappropriate for dealing with such 
negotiations, thus stressing its preference for such deliberations to be conducted 
primarily within the multilateral framework of the WTO (Hardacre, 2010).  Global 
agricultural trade liberalization talks nevertheless face a number of obstacles, such as 
the CAP, with the EU agri-business lobbying group having a crucial influence in the 
WTO forum, especially so when coupled with the equally powerful US agricultural 
lobby (Hardacre, 2010).  
One of the Doha Round’s expressed commitments is the gradual reduction - 
or even elimination - of ‘tariffs and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and 
services’ (WTO, 2001).  However, the main point of contention has since then 
centred on how exactly to define ‘environmental goods and services’ (Kaditi, 2009).  
Under the auspices of these negotiations, Brazil suggested in 2007 that biofuels be 
included in the list of environmental goods, a proposal categorically rejected by both 
the EU and the US on the grounds that not all types biofuels are by necessity 
sustainable (Josling et al., 2010).  Interestingly, this is arguably more of the case 
                                                            
19
 According to WTO rules, tariff bindings differ depending on whether a product is classified as an 
agricultural or an industrial good.  Whereas ethanol is considered an agricultural product, biodiesel is 
regarded an industrial one.  This is because products are classified based on their chemical 
composition and not on their potential use.  Apart from receiving different tariff classifications, WTO 
rules are more flexible regarding size of subsidies allowed for agricultural products (see Motaal, 
2008). 
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with regards to EU rapeseed biodiesel and US corn ethanol.  In any case, if the 
Brazilian request were to be granted, the newly established low-tariff regime would 
severely undermine the regulatory ability of these two actors to protect their biofuels 
industries and agricultural sectors from lower-priced imports (Josling et al., 2010).   
 It is rather straightforward why the US has strongly resisted discussing 
biofuels trade liberalization and why it has not followed the EU in adopting 
sustainability standards for the production and consumption of biofuels at the 
international level.  The US administration’s primary interest in promoting biofuels 
is energy security.  As noted earlier, whereas climate change and energy security are 
both seen by the EU as drivers of biofuels development, in the case of the US 
climate change mitigation is not part of the equation, especially so given the poor 
energy efficiency properties of its corn-based biofuels.  That said, an advocate of the 
EU normative power thesis would struggle to account for the bloc’s insistence to 
continue distorting international biofuels markets when there are cheaper and vastly 
more sustainable alternatives readily available.   
5. Conclusion  
This paper critically examined the stance of the EU in the field of biofuels policy and 
evaluated whether it has actively promoted policies that have furthered the norm of 
sustainable development, as would be expected of a normative power in global 
environmental politics.  In particular, it investigated whether European authorities 
have taken into account the social, environmental, economic and temporal 
dimensions of sustainable development within their biofuel promotion strategy.  
Whereas Europe’s approach was deemed clearly unsustainable from an economic, 
temporal and social angle, its efforts to preserve the environment should nevertheless 
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be complemented as noteworthy, notwithstanding that a great array of concerns 
needs still to be urgently addressed.   
 Current academic work on Europe’s global role was then considered.  To this 
effect, claims by a plethora of scholars that the EU is a ‘normative power’ in 
international relations were tested, using biofuels as a case study.  While not 
dismissing that there are basic values (e.g. environmental) underlying the EU’s 
regulatory approach towards biofuels, it was argued that an interest-based 
perspective could help acquire a more complete picture of how an actor’s 
preferences concerning international environmental regulation are shaped.   
 Specifically, it was posited that despite Europe’s normative power 
aspirations, the policy area of biofuels rather confirms the image of a large trading 
state, where trade competitiveness often receives higher ranking than environmental 
protection, thereby unbalancing sustainability.  In other words, while the EU is keen 
on portraying itself as a global green leader, such ambitions are effectively 
circumscribed by the strategically more central priority of ensuring that the pursuit of 
the sustainable development model does not come at the expense of economic power 
(Vanden Brande, 2008).  Political and economic realities therefore may well explain 
why despite the green leadership rhetoric, the results – implementation-wise – fail to 
match expectations.   
 In terms of overall significance, important lessons can be drawn from the 
biofuels case that could be readily applied to other cases of environmental 
diplomacy.  In the climate change regime, for instance, the EU has been largely 
assigned the role of the ‘leader’ whereas the US that of the ‘laggard’.  However, 
there is no denying that favourable circumstances in relation to energy production, 
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manufacturing and consumption in Europe have given the EU a substantial head start 
in relation to other UNFCCC Annex I Parties.20  Thus, taking into account political 
and economic parameters could provide valuable insights into why the EU, despite a 
general adherence to the principle of sustainable development, is acknowledged as a 
leader in certain fields (biosafety, climate) but not others (agriculture, fisheries) 
(Falkner, 2007). 
 Reasons aside, the EU has a positive track record of attempting to address 
European and global environmental issues.  Yet, it is imperative that the EU gives 
equal weight to the ‘internal’ as well as the ‘external’ repercussions of its 
sustainability legislation.  If its policies, such as in energy, trade, fisheries or 
agricultural, result in problems simply being ‘exported’ to other countries, then these 
policies are not genuinely sustainable in any sense.  Remedial action could include 
the adoption of a policy instrument of a similar nature to the 2001 SDS, followed 
this time by a strong commitment to its implementation.  Apart from dealing with all 
the dimensions of sustainable development in a mutually reinforcing manner, it is 
imperative that impacts on the developing world are also factored in. 
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 To offer but one example, the selection of the year 1990 as baseline in the Kyoto Protocol and the 
permission to fulfil its obligations as a ‘bubble’ allowed the EU to substantially benefit from emission 
reductions in Germany and the UK that were unrelated to climate policy and would thus have 
occurred anyway (see Afionis, 2011). 
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